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NOTES
Second Children Second Best?
Equal Protection for Successive Families
Under State Child Support Guidelines
Introduction
In the field of family law, Congress has enacted legislation that
culminated in requiring states to establish child support guidelines.' This
measure was necessary in order to control the amount of income that
must be transferred by the support-paying parent to the custodial parent
in circumstances in which the family is not intact. But no law controls
the number of children an individual may have. Should a support-paying
parent establish a subsequent family, a conflict develops between the suc-
cessive families over distribution of the support-paying parent's income.
If a state applies its child support guidelines in a manner favoring first
children over subsequent children, the result is a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the federal constitution.2
For the custodial parent, the legislation was desperately needed re-
lief. In the 1970s, the divorce rate more than doubled,3 creating single-
parent households most often headed by women.4 Typical divorce eco-
nomics inflicted poverty upon the mother and children while the father
enjoyed an improved standard of living.5 Many of these female-headed
households faced severe financial hardship.6 During this same period,
1. Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378, 98 Stat. 1305
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-667 (1984)).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
3. Hunter, Child Support Law and Policy: The Systematic Imposition of Costs on Wo-
men, 6 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 1 (1983) (citing BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, PUB. No. 372, MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS 1, 5 (table D)
(1982)).
4. Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 612 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, HOUSEHOLD
AND FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS 2 (1985)).
5. The standard of living of divorced fathers increased an average of 42% in the first year
after divorce while the standard of living of divorced mothers and their children declined an
average of 73%. L. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 323 (1985).
6. Bowen, 483 U.S. at 612 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, HOUSEHOLD AND FAMILY
CHARACTERISTICS 2 (1985)).
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dependency upon federal welfare programs, particularly Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC), increased.7 Congress recognized
that the failure of absent parents to support their children was a signifi-
cant cause of the alarming increase in the number of children living in
poverty and the resulting strain on the welfare system.8
Consequently, Congress attempted to shift the responsibility of sup-
porting children from the federal government to parents "by improving
the establishment and enforcement of child support orders."9 Congress
justified its measures on the ground that "all children have the right to
receive support from their fathers" 10 and that "as an effective support
collection system is established fathers will be deterred from deserting
their families to welfare and children will be spared the effects of family
breakup." 1
In 1974, Congress enacted the Social Services Amendments, Title
IV-D of the Social Security Act.1 2 Aimed at alleviating welfare depen-
dence, the new program established four basic services: location of ab-
sent parents; establishment of paternity; establishment of support; and
enforcement of support. 3 States that participated in the AFDC program
would suffer a reduction in federal funding if they failed to implement the
support enforcement program. 14
Nevertheless ten years later, support orders either were ignored by
absent parents or courts simply failed to issue them at all." In an effort
to increase the effectiveness of the Social Services Amendments of 1974,
Congress unanimously 6 amended the law in 1984.17 At this time, the
support enforcement provision was enlarged from AFDC situations, in
which the custodial parent is forced to seek the state's assistance in sup-
porting the children, to private situations, in which the custodial parent
7. Barber, Update on Title IV-D, 1 AM. J. FAM. L. 383 (1987).
8. S. REP. No. 1356, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 8133, 8145.
9. Billings, From Guesswork to Guidelines--The Adoption of Uniform Child Support
Guidelines in Utah, 1989 UTAH L. REv. 859, 873 (footnote omitted).
10. S. REP. No. 1356, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 8133, 8146.
11. Id.
12. Pub. L. No. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2337 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-662
(1981)).
13. S. REP. No. 1356, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 8133, 8133. The purpose behind these services was to obtain financial contribu-
tion from the absent parent in order to defray the cost of state welfare expenditures made on
behalf of children who were not receiving support from that parent.
14. S. REP. No. 1356, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 8133, 8134.
15. Horowitz, Congress Gets Tough, 8 FAM. ADvoc. 3, 3 (1985).
16. Dodson, A Guide to the Guidelines, 10 FAM. ADvoc. 4, 5 (1988).
17. Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, supra note 1.
is able to support the children without the state's help.18 In order to
enforce existing orders, the amendments required the states to adopt ad-
ditional collection procedures. They included the following: mandatory
wage withholding; expedited processes; interception of state and federal
income tax refunds; imposition of liens against real or personal property;
extension of statute of limitations on paternity; imposition of bonds or
other security; reporting to consumer credit reporting agencies; and de-
velopment and implementation of state child support guidelines. 9
The states were directed to create their own particular child support
guidelines by October 1, 1987.20 Congress had originally intended state
child support guidelines to serve merely an advisory function.2 But be-
cause judges who deviated from the guidelines generally set inadequate
awards,22 Congress amended the Child Support Enforcement Amend-
ments of 1984 as part of the Family Support Act of 198823 by mandating
that each state's child support guidelines were to carry presumptive
weight.24 This new requirement became effective in October 1990.25
18. S. REP. No. 387, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 2397, 2397.
19. S. REP. No. 387, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2397, 2398-99.
20. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 925, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 54, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2397, 2472.
21. Before being amended in 1988, section 667 provided:
(a) Establishment of guidelines; method
Each State, as a condition for having its State plan approved under this part,
must establish guidelines for child support award amounts within the State. The
guidelines may be established by law or by judicial or administrative action.
(b) Availability of guidelines; binding nature
The guidelines established pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall be
made available to all judges and other officials who have the power to determine
child support awards within such State but need not be binding upon such judges or
other officials.
(c) Technical assistance to States; State to furnish Secretary with copies
The Secretary shall furnish technical assistance to the States for establishing the
guidelines, and each State shall furnish the Secretary with copies of its guidelines.
42 U.S.C.A. § 667 (West Supp. 1985).
22. Billings, supra note 9, at 909 & n.277.
23. Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 641-669
(West Supp. 1990)).
24. S. REP. No. 377, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 17, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2776, 2779, 2794; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 998, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 91-92,
reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2776, 2879-80.
As a result of the amendments to section 667, the entirety of subsection (b) became sub-
section (b)(1) and the language "but need not be binding upon such judges or other officials"
was removed from the end of that subsection. A new subsection (b)(2) was also added:
There shall be a rebuttable presumption, in any judicial or administrative pro-
ceeding for the award of child support, that the amount of the award which would
result from the application of such guidelines is the correct amount of child support
to be awarded. A written finding or specific finding on the record that the applica-
tion of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate in a particular case, deter-
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Apart from creating that presumption, Congress left the job of defin-
ing child support guidelines to each state,26 which inevitably led to a
wide variety of guidelines. The federal law left the states to resolve such
issues as what should constitute income, whether income should be ad-
justed by taxes, whether the income of one or both parents should be the
basis of the support calculation, whether a second spouse's income
should be included, and whether the state guidelines applicable to the
support-paying parent or to the custodial parent should be applied in
interstate situations.27 Most importantly, the federal law failed to specify
how successive families should be considered in the support award
process.28
This Note argues that state child support guidelines which ignore
subsequent children are unconstitutional. Part I identifies the violation
of equal protection that occurs when application of state child support
guidelines discriminates against subsequent children and support-paying
parents. Part II analyzes the equal protection problem on all levels of
judicial review: strict scrutiny, which is applied in cases concerning sus-
pect classes or fundamental rights; heightened scrutiny; and mere ration-
ality. The Note concludes with the assertion that constitutionally sound
state child support guidelines must allow modification of prior support
orders based on the support-paying parent's responsibility for subse-
quently born or adopted children.
I. The Dilemma of Subsequent Children
When a couple, having children, breaks off the relationship, and,
thereafter, one of the parents has additional children by a new relation-
ship, a subsequent family is made. If the parent who has established the
subsequent family is also the parent who is obligated by court order to
pay support to the prior family, a conflict exists that often leads the par-
ties to the courts for resolution. In one common situation, the support-
paying parent, whose income is stretched between two families, requests
the court to reduce the support order based upon the need to support the
new family. In another common situation, the prior family requests the
court to increase the support award to reflect the growing needs of the
children while the support-paying parent responds by arguing the need to
support his or her new family.
mined under criteria established by the State, shall be sufficient to rebut the
presumption in that case.
42 U.S.C.A. § 667 (West Supp. 1990).
25. Billings, supra note 9, at 909.
26. S. REP. No. 387, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 40, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2397, 2436.
27. Barber, supra note 7, at 390.
28. Malone, Modification Lives, 10 FAM. ADvoc. 42, 43 (1988).
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When state child support guidelines require that an inflexible
amount of the support-paying parent's income is to be awarded to the
custodial parent, an equal protection argument arises in two forms. The
first is that the two sets of children are treated unequally because the first
children have priority over the support-paying parent's income. The sec-
ond is that the two sets of parents are treated unequally in that the custo-
dial parent, unlike the support-paying parent, is not forced to spend a
fixed amount of money on the children.
Equal treatment of subsequent children under state child support
guidelines is an emotionally charged issue.29 On the one hand, oppo-
nents argue that "[a] parent should meet his first family's needs before
taking on new obligations"30 and that it is unfair to modify awards re-
ceived by parties who relied on the original amount.31
On the other hand, proponents argue that it is unfair for judges to
give first children priority at the expense of subsequent children. One
commentator suggests that this type of intentional discrimination causes
"suffering by a different class of children."32 Judges in favor of recogniz-
ing the second family feel that "it is unfair, and perhaps unconstitutional,
to discriminate among children whose support orders happen to be en-
tered on different dates."33 Another commentator suggests that "support
enforcement for a 'first family' becomes socially counterproductive when
it threatens to deprive a 'second family' of a realistic basis for economic
survival." 34 Others argue that favoritism given to dependents of a prior
family could encourage divorce in the second family.35 Such a threat to
the subsequent family is not difficult to imagine. A previously unknown,
illegitimate, first-born child could suddenly present a demand for support
to a father several years after the father marries and produces other chil-
dren.36 Or the difficulty in meeting an inflexible financial obligation to
the prior family could strain a support-paying parent's new family to the
breaking point. An inflexible financial obligation to the first family may
even inhibit the support-paying parent from having additional children
altogether. During public child support guideline hearings by one state
task force, support-paying parents complained that, "after paying or-
29. See Billings, supra note 9, at 903 (discussing the recommendation "that the existence
of after-born children [should] not affect existing child support orders," which was made by
the Utah Task Force Committee on Needs of Children and the Committee on Parent's Ability
to Pay).
30. Malone, supra note 28, at 44.
31. Billings, supra note 9, at 903.
32. Malone, supra note 28, at 44.
33. Id. at 45.
34. Krause, Child Support Enforcement: Legislative Tasks for the Early 1980s, 15 FAM.
L.Q. 349, 356 (1982).
35. Malone, supra note 28, at 44.
36. Ginsburg, Judging the New Support Guidelines, 10 FAM. ADvoc. 28, 36 (1988).
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dered child support they [could not afford] a new second family."3
They raised the question whether state child support guidelines should
recognize the expense of a second family as a factor when modifying a
child support award for the prior family.3"
Only fourteen states allow judges to consider subsequently born or
adopted children when modifying original support orders.39 "Few if any
guidelines incorporate the expenses of second intact families directly into
the support computation, although many permit judges discretion to
consider such factors."'
Judicial discretion, however, is an insufficient remedy. Judges tradi-
tionally ignore a second family or downplay a support-paying parent's
new responsibility4 because creation of a second family is a voluntary
act done with knowledge of obligation to the first family.42 Moreover, a
first family relies on child support as originally set and thus incurs per-
manent expenses based on that amount.43 Yet, the burden should not
fall on innocent children.'
Another approach is to preclude the second family from decreasing
an existing child support award to the first family, but allow considera-
tion of the second family in determining an increase.' This "first mort-
gage' '"6 approach allows the prior family to base the support award on
the full amount of the support-paying parent's income. In contrast,
should a divorce occur in the second family, the second family begins
with a lower amount on which to base a child support award. Judges
subtract the amount of support paid to the first family before calculating
support for the second family.4' The inequity in this situation raises the
question whether first children should have "superior claims to their par-
37. Billings, supra nQte 9, at 879.
38. Ik at 901. Eighty-three percent of the judges responding to the state task force ques-
tionnaire felt that the court should be able to consider the support-paying parent's subsequent
children. Id at 881.
39. Id. at 902 & n.248.
40. Malone, supra note 28, at 44.
41. Krause, supra note 34, at 357.
42. Billings, supra note 9, at 902.
43. Id at 903.
44. Ginsburg, supra note 36, at 36.
45. Billings, supra note 9, at 903.
46. Malone, supra note 28, at 44.
47. Id For example, assume that the support-paying parent has one child from the first
marriage and one child from the second marriage, that the state child support guidelines re-
quire 20% of the support-paying parent's income for the support of one child, and that the
support-paying parent's monthly income is $2,000. The support award for the first family
would be $400 (based on the full $2,000). The support award for the second family, however,
would only be $320 (based on $1,600, the $2,000 monthly income less the $400 support award
for the first family).
ents' resources."48
The opposite approach would be to give the subsequent family pri-
ority over the first family. One commentator feels that, "despite the con-
stitutional considerations that favor equality, it is a permissible, even a
'compelling' state purpose, first to assure a basis of economic and social
survival for the current family before a payment to other dependents is
exacted."'49 But this approach is just as unfair for the same reasons as the
"first mortgage" approach. In fact, the same commentator recognizes
that "[w]hile society's interest in the economic and social survival of the
currently functioning family admittedly is great, even overwhelming, it
does not follow that this social interest should be asserted at the sole
expense of the 'earlier' children."50
The fairest judicial approach is to recognize the equality of all chil-
dren to whom the support-paying parent is obligated. This goal could be
achieved under state child support guidelines if the judge would use the
guidelines to calculate the amount of support based on the total number
of children and then prorate this amount between the families."1
Courts have not resolved the issue. On October 1, 1990, the United
States Supreme Court, without comment, refused to grant certiorari in
Scheidegg v. Ferguson.2 Appellant had raised several constitutional chal-
lenges, including equal protection, to the New Hampshire child support
guidelines; 3 had the Supreme Court decided the case, the equal protec-
tion issue may have been resolved.
State high courts have followed suit. While not quite ignoring the
issue altogether, the Nevada Supreme Court, for example, avoided it in
Hoover v. Hoover. 4 Appellant was the father of four children, two from
a first marriage and two from a second marriage. The trial court
awarded respondent, appellant's first wife, child support for her two chil-
dren based on twenty-five percent of appellant's gross monthly income as
required under Nevada's child support guidelines. Appellant appealed
on the ground that the court failed to consider his two subsequent chil-
dren. Appellant requested the court to base the award on thirty-one per-
cent of his gross monthly income as required for four children under
Nevada's child support guidelines, and then to divide this figure by four
to arrive at a "per child" award. 5 The court refused to adopt appellant's
48. Bruch, Developing Standards for Child Support Payments: A Critique of Current Prac-
tice, 16 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 49, 60 (1982).
49. Krause, supra note 34, at 357.
50. Id. at 359.
51. Billings, supra note 9, at 902-03.
52. 111 S. Ct. 75 (1990).
53. See Scheidegg v. Ferguson, 59 U.S.L.W. 3058 (U.S. July 24, 1990) (No. 89-2019).
54. 793 P.2d 1329 (Nev. 1990).
55. Whereas the "per child" figure advanced by appellant is only 7.75%, the Nevada
Child Support Guidelines' figure of 25% for two children is equivalent to 12.5% per child.
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formula and indicated that whether subsequent children should be
treated equally or receive diminished support under state child support
guidelines is an issue for the legislature.56
The South Dakota Supreme Court, however, in Feltman v.
Feltman57 squarely confronted the issue and upheld the constitutionality
of state child support guidelines that resulted in priority of support for
first children. As in Hoover, appellant was the father of four children,
two from a first marriage and two from a second marriage. Respondent,
appellant's first wife, requested the court to increase the amount of sup-
port for her two children. The court considered appellant's obligation to
support his two subsequent children, but refused to mitigate the re-
quested increase. The court found that the legislature intended to give
priority to first children. The court then held that under the lowest stan-
dard of review the rational basis test was satisfied because the state had
an interest in protecting the standard of living of children. Additionally,
a second family is created with the knowledge of the obligation to the
first family.58
An Illinois appellate court in Boris v. Blaisdell59 found unpersuasive
an equal protection argument that Illinois child support guidelines un-
fairly discriminate against men because men outnumber women as non-
custodial parents. Using the lowest standard of judicial review, the court
noted that with regard to economic regulations, "[t]he equal protection
clause does not deny a state the power to differentiate between persons
similarly situated if there is a rational basis for doing so."'  While con-
ceding that the father is typically the support-paying parent, the court
indicated that the mother, as custodial parent, makes significant nonfi-
nancial contributions. Therefore, there was a rational basis for the dis-
tinction and no violation of equal protection had occured.6'
The Illinois appellate court also dismissed an argument suggesting
that appellant, under the guidelines, was denied substantive due process
in the right to remarry and have additional children.62 The court felt
56. Hoover, 793 P.2d at 1329.
57. 434 N.W.2d 590 (S.D. 1989).
58. Id. at 593. In response to the Feltman decision, the South Dakota legislature in 1989
amended the state child support guidelines expressly to provide a list of deviation factors that
included: "The obligation of either parent to provide for subsequent natural children or step-
children. However, an existing support order may not be modified solely for this reason."
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-7-6.10 (1989); see also Note, Major Changes in South Dakota
Child Support The 1989 Revisions, 34 S.D.L. REv. 573, 594-97 (1989) (discussing the 10
deviation factors enacted by the 1989 legislature).
59. 142 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 492 N.E.2d 622 (1986). The case did not involve subsequent
children. Appellant father was defending against respondent mother's request for an increase
in the child support award.
60. IJd at 1046, 492 N.E.2d at 630 (citations omitted).
61. IA at 1048, 492 N.E.2d at 631.
62. Id. at 1046, 492 N.E.2d at 630.
CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES
that accepting appellant's argument would be detrimental to both the
legislature's and the court's duties to regulate and enforce child support
orders.63
One year before the Illinois appellate court set forth its opinion, a
critic of the same Illinois child support guidelines reached a contrary
conclusion." The critic relied on three distinct arguments. Although
agreeing that state child support guidelines are necessary because some
parents fail to support their children, the critic first argued that inflexible
awards are unconstitutional. 65 Under the theory that the state is intrud-
ing on the parent's fundamental right of choice in providing for children,
the critic reasoned that the amount of money a parent spends on a child
is a decision of conscience. 66 Second, the critic argued that the support-
paying parent has a right to procreate, which is abridged by an unmodifi-
able support obligation to first children. 67 Third, the critic argued that
children themselves have a right to equal support,6" which is violated
when inflexible awards are made to prior families. Inflexible awards cre-
ate classes of children based on parental marital status. 69 By statute,
children from the support-paying parent's first family are always assured
a maintained standard of living regardless of when siblings enter the sup-
port-paying parent's second family.7° This distinction deprives children
of intact families a maintained standard of living when younger siblings
enter the same family.
A Wisconsin trial court challenged the constitutionality of state
child support guidelines sua sponte.7 Indicating that a higher level of
scrutiny was appropriate, the judge ruled that the state "must show a
compelling interest in order to burden the relationship between parent
63. Id.
64. Note, Recent Amendments to Illinois Child Support Statutes: Income Percentage
Guidelines, 19 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 207 (1985).
65. Id. at 209-10.
66. Id at 209.
67. Id
68. Id at 211.
69. Id. at 211-12.
70. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. In the example in note 47, the support-
paying parent is paying $720 (36% of monthly income) in child support for two children. Had
both children been from the first marriage, the percentage of child support would have been
significantly less. State child support guidelines require that a greater percentage of income is
to be awarded as the number of children increases. The required increase in support, however,
is not directly proportional to the number of children. To illustrate, a sole dependent child
would get 20%, while each of six children would only get about 8%. See Note, supra note 64,
at 212. In effect, when the children are all from the same family, subsequent children are
indeed taken into consideration in the calculation of the child support award, but not so when
the children are from different families.
71. The decision by Judge Dennis C. Luebke of the State of Wisconsin Circuit Court,
Outagamie County, is unreported, but is reprinted in Wisconsin Trial Court Holds Child Sup-
port Standards to be Unconstitutional, 2 AM. J. FAM. L. 124 (1988).
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and child .... "72 Finding that the state had a compelling interest in the
welfare of children from divorced families and an interest in the welfare
of custodial parents, the court held that the regulation must be accom-
plished in a manner that is the least drastic means necessary to accom-
plish the result desired pursuant to Wisconsin child support guidelines.73
The judge identified three ways in which the state child support
guidelines result in unjustified disparities. First, the support-paying par-
ent of a nonintact family is required to spend a mandatory amount of
money on the children. This requirement ignores the right of the
wealthy to choose to live frugally, whereas an intact family is not simni-
larly subject to state regulation.74 Second, children from separate,
nonintact families, who have the same parental combined income, will
receive different awards depending upon who the support-paying parent
is because the state does not mandate the amount the custodial parent
must actually spend on the children.7" Third, fathers, who are typically
the noncustodial parents, are not allowed to make decisions regarding
how money is to be spent on their children. The result is an unconstitu-
tional inequality of treatment between males and females.76
II. Equal Protection Analysis
The Equal Protection Clause provides: "[N]or [shall any State]
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."77
When a statute, such as state child support guidelines, is challenged
under this Clause, a court will apply one of three tests, or standards, that
the statute must meet to withstand constitutional attack. The selection
of the standard turns on the type of classification created by the statute.
In a recent opinion,78 the United States Supreme Court outlined these
options:
In considering whether state legislation violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, we apply differ-
ent levels of scrutiny to different types of classifications. At a mini-
mum, a statutory classification must be rationally related to a
legitimate governmental purpose. Classifications based on race or
national origin, and classifications affecting fundamental rights, are
72. IM. at 142.
73. Id at 143-44.
74. Id. at 142-43.
75. Id at 143. For example, assume Parent A earns $10,000 per year and Parent B earns
$20,000 per year. If the support-paying parent isA, the support award will be lower than if the
support-paying parent is B, even though in either situation the total combined parental income
is the same.
76. Id
77. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
78. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988).
given the most exacting scrutiny. Between these extremes of ra-
tional basis review and strict scrutiny lies a level of intermediate
scrutiny, which generally has been applied to discriminatory classi-
fications based on sex or illegitimacy."
Thus, the threshold question in equal protection analysis is to deter-
mine the appropriate level of scrutiny. This Note will discuss each of the
three levels of scrutiny in regard to state child support guidelines.
A. Strict Scrutiny
Strict scrutiny is equal protection's highest standard.80 A statute
analyzed under strict scrutiny carries a heavy presumption of unconstitu-
tionality because the state must overcome the burden of showing that the
statute is necessary in order to achieve a compelling government inter-
est."1 Thus, the state interest behind the statute must be of the utmost
importance. If the state interest is compelling, the statute must also
achieve its purpose in a manner that is narrowly tailored to the purpose.
Any less discriminatory means to achieve the same ends must always be
used.82 Most statutes fail to satisfy the exacting standard of strict
scrutiny.8 3
In order for the court to apply strict scrutiny in its evaluation of a
statute, the statute must either discriminate against a suspect class or
interfere with a fundamental right. 4
1. Suspect Class
In early equal protection analysis, the United States Supreme Court
suggested that a higher level of scrutiny may be required for situations
that cause "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities ... which
tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordi-
narily to be relied upon to protect minorities .... "I' This suggestion
developed into the "traditional indicia of suspectness" defined as whether
the class is "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history
of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of polit-
ical powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process."86 That test has remained essentially
unchanged.
79. Id. at 461 (citations omitted).
80. Id
81. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16 (1973).
82. Id at 17.
83. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAnv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972).
84. San Antonio Indep. School DisL, 411 U.S. at 16.
85. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1937).
86. San Antonio Indep. School DisL, 411 U.S. at 28.
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More recently, the Supreme Court has set forth the modem ele-
ments identifying a suspect class: a history of discrimination against
members of the class; exhibition of obvious, immutable, or distinguishing
characteristics, such as skin color, which define a discrete group; and the
political powerlessness of the class, due to their minority status, to be
heard in the representative system.87 The Court has also indicated that
the class should be delineated with some particularity. 88
With regard to subsequent children, two classes could be defined:
that class which contains as its members support-paying parents and that
class which contains as its members subsequent children.
(a) Support-Paying Parents as a Suspect Class
Thus far, the Supreme Court has been unwilling to extend suspect
classification beyond the characteristics of race or national origin. Yet a
trial judge, Dennis C. Luebke, argues for extending application of the
strict scrutiny standard to Wisconsin child support guidelines.8 9
The judge's arguments are unpersuasive. First, Luebke attempts to
satisfy the element of immutability by pointing out that one cannot
choose one's parents.90 While factually true, it is the parent, not the
child, who is the subject of discrimination under Luebke's analysis.
Luebke recognized that the relevant characteristic is the divorced status
of the parent. But he dismissed this classification because the "funda-
mental relationship" is between parent and child.91 Indeed, a classifica-
tion based on divorced parents as a group would be inappropriate, but for
a different reason. By failing to distinguish between custodial parents
and support-paying parents, the classification is overinclusive. The dis-
advantaged class would be suitably narrowed if defined as composed of
divorced support-paying parents. Both arguments fail because neither
the divorced nor support-paying statuses are entirely immutable traits.
Alternatively, Luebke argues that divorced parents are "highly visi-
ble within the judicial system" while at the same time conceding that one
cannot recognize a divorced parent by looking at them.92 Becoming a
divorced parent generally, or becoming a support-paying parent specifi-
cally, simply does not transfer visually obvious, distinguishing character-
istics upon an individual to mark them into membership of a discrete
group.
Second, Luebke argues that unmarried parents are historically dis-
87. Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986).
88. San Antonio Indep. SchoolDisL, 411 U.S. at 19.
89. Luebke, supra note 71, at 140-42.
90. Id. at 140.
91. Id.
92. Id
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advantaged. 93 This group is overinclusive because it fails to distinguish
between the custodial parent and the support-paying parent. Moreover,
Luebke admits a lack of substantial empirical data to support his
assertion. 94
Finally, Luebke argues that there is a relative lack of political repre-
sentation by proposing that the typical female custodial parent enjoys an
awareness or ability to generate representation within the political arena
that is unmatched by the typical male support-paying parent.95 An argu-
ment that compares a male's political ability unfavorably with a female's
political ability is simply historically unsupportable.96
Therefore, the characteristics of support-paying parents fall short of
achieving the status of a suspect class.
(b) Subsequent Children as a Suspect Class
Similarly, an attempt to create a suspect class composed of subse-
quent children would not succeed. Subsequent children have not histori-
cally been the subject of discrimination. An argument to the contrary is
unavailing in light of a recent case in which the Supreme Court refused
to define close relatives as a suspect class.97 If a group composed of close
relatives that includes siblings cannot be a suspect class, then it would
follow that a group composed of subsequent children, siblings to the first
children, would likewise not reach suspect classification. Moreover, sub-
sequent children do not exhibit obvious or distinguishing characteristics
that result in their immediate identification into a discrete group.
The priority of one's birth, however, is undoubtedly an immutable
characteristic. Furthermore, as minors without the power to vote, de-
pendent subsequent children are politically powerless individually. They
must rely upon their parents to represent their political interests. These
characteristics may well demand quasi-suspect classification. Quasi-sus-
pect classification does not merit strict scrutiny, but it does fall into the
standard of heightened scrutiny.98
Although it is unlikely that the Supreme Court would grant suspect
class status to either support-paying parents or subsequently born or
93. Id.
94. 1d
95. Id. at 141.
96. See Schafran, Overwhelming Evidence: Reports on Gender Bias in the Courts, 26
TRIAL 28, 29-30 (1990).
97. Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635 (1986). In Lyng, the Court refused to apply strict
scrutiny to classifications composed of close relatives in regard to the Federal Food Stamp
Program. Id. at 638. The Program provides funds to individual "households," which are
defined as parents, children, and siblings who live together, but defines other relatives or unre-
lated persons who live together as "multiple households."
98. See infra notes 137-74 and accompanying text.
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adopted children, strict scrutiny can still be invoked under the alternative
theory of interference with a fundamental right.
2. Fundamental Right
A state may not deny a certain group access to fundamental rights,
nor may it unduly burden a particular group in the exercise of those
rights. If a state denies or burdens the exercise of fundamental rights, the
state must articulate a compelling reason for its action in order to survive
strict scrutiny.99 "If a law has 'no other purpose... than to chill the
assertion of constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose to exer-
cise them, then it [is] patently unconstitutional.' ,o
The initial question, then, is whether a right is fundamental for
equal protection purposes. Although the Supreme Court has refused to
create substantive constitutional rights, it has cautioned that whether a
right is fundamental may not be determined solely by the importance of
the deprived benefit. 10 1 A fundamental right must be found either ex-
pressly or implicitly within the Constitution." 2 The Court has expressly
recognized voting,1 3 interstate migration,"' and procreation 0 5 as con-
stitutionally protected fundamental rights.
In regard to state child support guidelines, two distinct rights may
be identified when considering subsequent children: the right of support-
paying parents to procreate and the right of dependent subsequent chil-
dren to receive support.
(a) Infringement of Support-Paying Parent's Fundamental Right to
Procreate
The Supreme Court has expressly recognized that procreation is
"one of the basic civil rights of man.... [It is] fundamental to the very
existence and survival of the race."'0 6 Consequently, states have been
restricted in their attempts to regulate individual reproductive
99. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
100. Id. at 631 (quoting United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968)).
101. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973); cf id. at 99, 102-
03 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (advocating a sliding scale approach to the determination of fun-
damental rights under equal protection analysis that would offer protection against deprivation
of rights in proportion to their degree of social value).
102. See 411 U.S. at 33.
103. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (invalidating Tennessee voter statute that
required residency within state for one year and residency within county for three months).
104. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (invalidating District of Columbia statute
that denied welfare to residents who had not resided within jurisdiction for at least one year
immediately prior to application for benefits).
105. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (invalidating Oklahoma statute that pro-
vided for sterilization of habitual felons). But see Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (steriliza-
tion allowed on person afflicted with a hereditary form of imbecility).
106. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
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freedom. 10 7
Yet, recent Supreme Court opinions suggest that the state is not en-
tirely restrained.108 One commentator questions whether these opinions
apply "only to impede a woman's decision not to bear children or
whether [they] would also sustain financial disincentives for fathers who
are considering more children."1' 9
But the Supreme Court did denounce such egregious invasions of
privacy when it wrote:
Surely the Government, absent a showing of a compelling subordi-
nating state interest, could not decree that all husbands and wives
must be sterilized after two children have been born to them....
[It would be] shocking to believe that the personal liberty guaran-
teed by the Constitution does not include protection against such
totalitarian limitation of family size ....
When a state statute mandates that an inflexible amount of income
from the support-paying parent must be given to the first family, the state
decreases the amount of funds available for any future children contem-
plated by the support-paying parent. The state thus effectively inhibits
the number of children the support-paying parent may have. By abso-
lutely ignoring the needs of subsequent children, the state compromises
the support-paying parent's fundamental right to procreate.
Because the fundamental right to procreate is implicated, any classi-
fication that serves to penalize the exercise of that right must be both
"necessary to promote a compelling government interest" ' and nar-
rowly tailored to serve only that legitimate interest. 12 In other words, if
a fundamental right is infringed, a state may only use the least discrimi-
natory means to achieve its governmental purpose.' 1 3
To ascertain the government interest furthered by state child sup-
port guidelines, it is useful to turn to the legislative history.
(1) Fiscal Integrity of Government Programs
The original purpose of the Social Services Amendments of 1974114
107. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (invalidating Texas statute criminalizing abortion);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (invalidating Connecticut statute criminalizing
the use of contraceptives).
108. Bruch, supra note 48, at 61 (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (Medicare
may fund childbirth but not abortions); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977) (county hospital
need not provide abortions)).
109. Id.
110. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 496-97.
111. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
112. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
113. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
114. Pub. L. No. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2337 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-662
(1981)).
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was to relieve dependence on welfare funds.115 Although recognizing
"that a State has valid interest in preserving the fiscal integrity of its
programs,"'1 16 the United States Supreme Court held that such a purpose
is not sufficiently compelling to withstand strict scrutiny.117
Moreover, state regulation that fails to protect subsequent children
is underinclusive with respect to the state's fiscal interest. It is not nar-
rowly tailored to preserve welfare funds. By refusing to protect them,
the state may in effect force the subsequent children to receive the very
welfare funds saved by allocating funds to the first family. Therefore, the
government's interest in conserving welfare funds will not excuse in-
fringement upon the support-paying parent's fundamental right to
procreate.
(2) Sufficient Support for Children
When the Social Services Amendments of 1974118 were subsequently
strengthened by the Child Support Enforcement Amendments of
1984,119 Congress required the states to enact child support guidelines. 120
The primary purpose for requiring states to adopt guidelines was to cor-
rect deficiencies in child support awards. Congress encouraged states to
increase awards that were set too low to provide adequately for the needs
of children in light of the support-paying parent's ability to pay.121
Therefore, providing sufficient support for dependent children of a first
family was made a compelling government interest.
Providing sufficient support for dependent children of a subsequent
family is an equally compelling interest. The government interest under-
lying state child support guidelines is in guaranteeing sufficient support
for children generally. Application of state child support guidelines that
ignore subsequent children is underinclusive in meeting the government
interest. To avoid this problem of providing sufficient support for one
class of children but not another, the support-paying parent's ability to
pay should be determined with the needs of all the support-paying par-
ent's dependent children in mind.
115. See supra notes 7-14 and accompanying text.
116. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969).
117. Id.
118. Pub. L. No. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2337 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-662
(1981)).
119. Pub. L. No. 98-378, 98 Stat. 1305 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-667
(1984)).
120. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
121. S. REP. No. 387, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 40, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2397, 2436.
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(3) Limitation of Family Size
When a state ignores subsequent children in setting support for a
prior family, the result is a restraint on the number of children a support-
paying parent may have in proportion to earning power. Direct control
of family size in relation to an individual's wealth has never been consid-
ered legitimate government interest. Moreover, an attempt to control
family size by discriminating against the support-paying parent's ability
to have more children is grossly underinclusive.'22
(4) Discrimination Against Subsequent Children
States also promulgated child support guidelines because of the gov-
ernment interest in improving fairness.123 Simply stated, similarly situ-
ated parties should be treated similarly. In regard to successive families,
first children and subsequent children are similarly situated when they
both are supported by the same parent. When that parent is required to
pay different amounts to the same number of children in each successive
family, the children are not treated similarly:
(5) Administrative Convenience
By promulgating child support guidelines, the states satisfy various
government administrative interests, including: improved expediency in
setting child support awards because the judge's determination of the
amount was made easier;" elimination of forum shopping because the
guidelines controlled judicial discretion, thereby discouraging the parties
from searching for a judge who tended to make awards favorable to their
situation; and avoidance of litigation because the amount of the award
was predictable.' 25 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has established that
administrative convenience is not a compelling government interest.126
More recently, the Court indicated that "[lt may be that there are levels
of administrative convenience that will justify discriminations that are
subject to heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause," '12 7
122. See infra notes 178-79 and accompanying text.
123. S. REP. No. 387, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 40, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMiN. NEWS 2397, 2436.
124. Munsterman, Grimm & Henderson, The Current Status of State Child Support Guide-
lines, 14 STATE CT. J. 4, 5 (1990).
125. Albano & Dennis Jr., Child Support Guidelines." A Necessary Evil?, 8 FAM. ADVOc. 4
(1985).
126. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 217 (1977) (widowers were discriminated against
under the Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Benefits Program because
wives generally were supported by husbands while the reverse was the exception; the Court
held, however, that the administrative convenience achieved in not having to find out whether
the husband was supported by the wife was not a compelling interest).
127. Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 152 (1980).
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but so far the Court has refused to so find. 128
In regard to child support awards, the only real savings may be in
avoiding court costs for hearings sought by the support-paying parent to
reduce child support awards when the support-paying parent assumes
responsibility for subsequent children. But if the state child support
guidelines clearly provided for subsequent children, the necessity for liti-
gation would be significantly decreased.
(6) Prorating Support Between First Children and Subsequent Children
Prorating the amount of child support for the total number of chil-
dren for whom the support-paying parent is responsible would serve the
government's legitimate objectives in a manner that would not discrimi-
nate against either the support-paying parent or his or her subsequent
children. First, the government interest in preserving welfare funds
would be served because subsequtent children would have an increased
ability to avoid AFDC. Second, the government interest in providing
support for children would be served because both families would have
the same ability to receive sufficient support. Third, the government in-
terest in fairness would be served because similarly situated children
would receive the same level of support. Furthermore, discrimination
against support-paying parents would be avoided because they would be
allowed to spread income evenly among all their children.
In addition, the government interest in administrative convenience
would be just as well served by state child support guidelines that unam-
biguously included subsequent children. There would be minimal need
for litigation because the parties would know how the court would re-
solve the issue. For the same reason, the expediency goal would be
served. Forum shopping would be eliminated because all judges would
resolve the issue in the same way.
(b) Infringement of Subsequent Children's Fundamental Right to
Receive Support
On many occasions litigants have argued that the right to receive
certain necessities, such as welfare benefits,129 housing,130 and educa-
128. Justice Stevens thought that if offsetting costs were significant, administrative conven-
ience might justify discrimination, but he did not offer examples of qualifying circumstances.
Caftfano, 430 U.S. at 219 (Stevens, J., concurring).
129. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (upholding, against an equal protection
argument advanced by large families, the maximum limit imposed under the AFDC program
on the total amount of aid that any one family could receive).
130. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (upholding, against an equal protection argu-
ment advanced by low income persons who desired public housing, a provision in the Califor-
nia Constitution that allowed a city to vote on whether a low income housing project will be
developed by the state).
tion,'3 is fundamental. The Supreme Court, however, has refused to
extend the concept of fundamental rights to include these important es-
sentials. 32 Therefore, it is likely that the Court would similarly refuse to
characterize subsequent children's right to equivalent support as funda-
mental. Consequently, courts are prohibited from using the strict scru-
tiny standard when determining the constitutionality of state child
support guidelines that discriminate against subsequent children.
Yet in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County,133 the Supreme Court
indicated that "governmental privileges or benefits necessary to basic sus-
tenance have often been viewed as being of greater constitutional signifi-
cance than less essential forms of governmental entitlements."' 134
Applying this reasoning, the Court held that medical care was a basic
necessity of life for which mid-level scrutiny was appropriate. 135 Thus,
heightened scrutiny may be appropriate in regard to infringement of cer-
tain necessities. 3
6
B. Heightened Scrutiny
Heightened scrutiny is the intermediate standard between strict
scrutiny and mere rationality. 37 Heightened scrutiny has been applied
to statutes that discriminate on the basis of quasi-suspect classification,
including gender, 13 alienage, 139 and illegitimacy."4
The United States Supreme Court has stated that "[t]o withstand
intermediate scrutiny, a statutory classification must be substantially re-
131. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (upholding, against
an equal protection argument advanced by school districts that were disparately treated, a
Texas regulation that supplemented financing of public education by taxing property within a
school district).
132. Dandridge, 397 U.S. 471; James, 402 U.S. 137; San Antonio Indep. School Dist., 411
U.S. 1.
133. 415 U.S. 250, 259 (1974) (indigent medical care); see also United States Dep't of
Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (holding that a provision of the Food Stamps Act
defining households to include only related persons created an irrational classification in viola-
tion of the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause).
134. Memorial Hosp., 415 U.S. at 259.
135. Id.
136. See infra notes 137-74 and accompanying text.
137. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988).
138. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (invalidating Oklahoma statute that prohibited
the sale of "3.2 beer" to males under the age of 21 but allowed the sale to females 18 years old
and over).
139. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (invalidating Texas statute that authorized public
school districts to deny enrollment to illegal alien children).
140. Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 8 (1983) (invalidating Tennessee statute that barred
paternity suits on behalf of illegitimate children which had been filed more than two years after
the child's birth).
The application of heightened scrutiny to laws that discriminate on the basis of illegiti-
macy was unanimously affirmed by the current Court, except for Justice Souter, who recently
replaced Justice Brennan.
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lated to an important governmental objective." '141 In contrast with the
strict scrutiny standard, the fit between the means of the state law (the
child support guidelines) and the end (the government interest) must be
reasonably tight, but need not be perfect. The availability of regulatory
alternatives that do not discriminate against the quasi-suspect class is an
important consideration, but is not mandated.142 In contrast with the
lower, mere rationality, standard the Supreme Court will only consider
the actual motives of the state legislature in enacting the statute in its
equal protection analysis. A legitimate motive cannot be created to jus-
tify the statute after enactment. The parallels that can be drawn between
illegitimate children and subsequent children under equal protection
analysis are striking.
Illegitimacy, like one's birth order, is an immutable trait. "[Tihe
legal status of illegitimacy, however defined, is, like race or national ori-
gin, a characteristic determined by causes not within the control of the
illegitimate individual, and it bears no relation to the individual's ability
to participate in and contribute to society."' 43 Because discrimination
against illegitimate children has never been as acute as discrimination
based on race or gender, the Court has rejected the strict scrutiny stan-
dard.'" Furthermore, because illegitimacy, like one's birth order, is not
visibly obvious, as is race or sex, there is no reason to protect either ille-
gitimate children or subsequent children against majoritarian political
processes.145
The Supreme Court, however, has indicated that "the presumption
of statutory validity may also be undermined when a State has enacted
legislation'creating classes based upon certain other immutable human
attributes."' 46 When a state statute draws a distinction on the basis of an
immutable characteristic, the statute creates a quasi-suspect class. For a
statute that discriminates against a quasi-suspect class to survive a con-
stitutional challenge, it must be able to withstand heightened scrutiny.
141. Clark, 486 U.S. at 461.
142. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976); cf
Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 274 (1978) ("it is not the function of a court 'to hypothesize
independently on the desirability or feasibility of any possible alternative[s]"' (quoting Ma-
thews, 427 U.S. at 515)).
143. Mathews, 427 U.S. at 505; see City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S.
432 (1985) (because mentally retarded individuals have a reduced ability to contribute to soci-
ety, the state has a legitimate interest in regulating them; therefore, the Court refused to grant
quasi-suspect classification to mentally retarded individuals).
144. Mathews, 427 U.S. at 506.
145. See id.
146. Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351 (1979) (invalidating Georgia statute that al-
lowed the mother a cause of action for the wrongful death of her illegitimate child, but re-
quired that the father meet certain conditions in order to sue for the wrongful death of his
illegitimate child).
In Levy v. Louisiana,47 the Supreme Court first considered the con-
stitutionality of a state statute that denied benefits to illegitimate chil-
dren. 148  The statute discriminated between groups of children on the
basis of their parents' marital status. The state's purpose for the distinc-
tion was to protect public morality and discourage parents from having
children out of wedlock. 49 The Court queried, "Why should the illegiti-
mate child be denied rights merely because of his birth out of wed-
lock?"' 150 The Court answered the question by finding that the state's
interest was not sufficiently important to withstand heightened scrutiny.
The Court accordingly found the statute to be unconstitutional.'
If protection of public morality is not a sufficiently important gov-
ernment interest, it follows that discouraging parents from divorcing is
similarly an insufficient government interest to support discrimination
against subsequent children.
Three years after Levy, the Supreme Court in Labine v. Vincent'52
upheld the constitutionality of an intestacy law that discriminated
against illegitimate children. 153 The state's important interest was in set-
tling land claims.' 54 Similarly, in Mathews v. Lucas,'55 discrimination
against illegitimate children in regard to claims against their father's sur-
vivorship benefits under the Social Security Act'56 was found substan-
tially related to the government interest in administrative convenience,
which was achieved by avoiding problems of proving parentage. 57
With regard to subsequent children, however, there is no dispute as
to the support-paying parent's responsibility. Thus the concerns raised
with regard to illegitimate children do not apply. Administrative con-
venience, therefore, should not excuse discrimination against subsequent
children. Additionally, the administrative inconvenience of resolving
147. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
148. Id. (Louisiana statute denied to illegitimate children a cause of action for the wrongful
death of their mother).
149. Id. at 69.
150. Id. at 71.
151. Id at 72.
152. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
153. Id (Louisiana statute allowed illegitimate children to take their deceased father's es-
tate only if the children were acknowledged by the father and if he left no legitimate descend-
ants, ascendants, collateral relations, or spouse).
154. d; see also Lalli v. Ill, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (New York statute that allowed Megiti-
mate children to inherit under intestacy laws only if an order of paternity had been entered
during the father's lifetime survived constitutional attack).
155. 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
156. For the purpose of receiving survivorship benefits under the Federal Social Security
Act, legitimate children were presumed dependents of their father but the presumption was
not extended to illegitimate children.
157. Mathews, 427 U.S. at 509. The dissenters, however, "committed to the proposition
that all persons are created equal," id at 516 (Stevens, J., dissenting), required a "weightier"
governmental interest to support heightened scrutiny, id at 518-19 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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disputes over modification of child support orders for the purpose of con-
sidering subsequent children can easily be removed. Clear legislative di-
rection under the state child support guidelines, for example, can dictate
how the support-paying parent's income is to be distributed under the
circumstances.
Moreover, the Labine majority distinguished Levy on the ground
that the children in Levy faced an "insurmountable barrier" to relief,
whereas in Labine the children's father could have removed the disability
by legitimizing the children or providing for them in his will.158 In re-
gard to subsequent children, although the support-paying parent could
voluntarily offer a higher level of support to the subsequent children
equivalent to the first family, if state child support guidelines took too
much income away, that remedy may be impossible to achieve.
More recently, the Court has indicated that it would be more willing
to find an insurmountable barrier when the child himself or herself could
not remove it.159 The support-paying parent's inability or unwillingness
to provide support at the greater rate required under state child support
guidelines for first children would constitute such an insurmountable
barrier to the subsequent child. A child's birth order is another factor
over which the child has no control.
The Court's four dissenters in Labine recognized that "[t]his Court
has generally treated as suspect a classification that discriminates against
an individual on the basis of factors over which he has no control" 160 and
found the state's real purpose was to "punish[ ] illegitimate children for
the misdeeds of their parents." 161
The very next year, the reasoning of the Labine dissenters was
adopted by the majority in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 162 and
has been persistently invoked over the last twenty years:1 6
The status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages soci-
ety's condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of
marriage. But visiting this condemnation on the head of an infant
is illogical and unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities on the ille-
gitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that
legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsi-
bility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is responsible for his
birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffectual-as well
158. Labine, 401 U.S. at 539.
159. Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1 (1983); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982).
160. Labine, 401 U.S. at 552 n.19 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
161. Id at 557 (Brennan, ., dissenting).
162. 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (invalidating Louisiana statute that penalized illegitimate chil-
dren under the state's workers' compensation laws).
163. Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 7 (1983); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 352-53
(1979); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 769-70 (1977); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505
(1976).
as unjust-way of deterring the parent."
In addition, the Supreme Court in Trimble v. Gordon16 held that a
state may not "attempt to influence the actions of men and women by
imposing sanctions on the children." '166 The Court explained that "[t]he
parents have the ability to conform their conduct to societal norms, but
their illegitimate children can affect neither their parents' conduct nor
their own status." '1 67
The recurring argument in favor of ignoring subsequent children is
that the support-paying parent has subsequent children with the knowl-
edge of the obligation owed to the first family. The assumption underly-
ing this argumefit is that one should be discouraged from having
additional children unless one can afford to support all of the children.
But this objective punishes children for their parents' actions, a result
that the Court has found impermissible.
Furthermore, the Weber Court emphasized that "[the illegitimate
children] are dependent children, and as such are entitled to rights
granted other dependent children."1 68 Expounding upon this principle,
the Court in Gomez v. Perez1 69 declared that "a State may not invidiously
discriminate against illegitimate children by denying them substantial
benefits accorded children generally."1 70 The Court refused to deny ilMe-
gitimate children support from their natural father. 71 Obviously, subse-
quent children are dependents of their parent, whether or not that parent
is obligated to support prior children. In light of Weber and Gomez,
child support guidelines that favor first children over subsequent children
are indefensible. The parallels between an illegitimate child's right to
support and a subsequent child's right to support are clear. "If discrimi-
nation on the basis of illegitimacy is impermissible, discrimination on the
basis of priority of birth seems equally untenable."' 172
Chief Justice Rehnquist has argued that equal protection does not
require that all persons be treated equally; only those persons similarly
situated must be treated equally.1 73 The strongest example of similarly
situated persons is dependent children of the very same support-paying
parent.
164. Weber, 406 U.S. at 175 (citations omitted).
165. 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (invalidating provision of Illinois Probate Code that distinguished
between legitimate and illegitimate children for the purpose of allowing only legitimate chil-
dren to inherit from their mother's estate under intestacy laws).
166. Ia at 769.
167. Id at 770.
168. 406 U.S. at 170 (emphasis in original).
169. 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (invalidating Texas statute that denied illegitimate children the
right to enforce support judgments against their fathers).
170. Id at 538.
171. Id at 535.
172. Krause, supra note 34, at 357 (footnote omitted).
173. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 780 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Therefore, "[t]he logical conclusion would be to put all children on
an equal footing regardless of priority .... The support award for chil-
dren would thus be determined on the basis of full equality of each
child's claim on the father's resources."' 74
C. Mere Rationality
The lowest level of scrutiny, which carries a heavy presumption of
constitutionality, merely requires that the statute bear a rational relation-
ship between the means and the ends."' The judiciary will afford ex-
treme deference to the purpose of the statute.' 76 If any plausible reason
for enactment of the statute exists, the Court will not attempt to deter-
mine whether this reason actually motivated the legislature.177
State legislatures have argued that ignoring subsequent children in
fixing the child support award for the first family is an appropriate means
for achieving several government ends.' 7 ' These ends, however, fail to
meet the mere rationality test.
First, ignoring subsequent children as a means of preserving welfare
funds is underinclusive. By forcing the support-paying parent to give a
disproportionate share of income to the first family, the support-paying
parent's second family may well be forced to seek welfare relief. The
statute is therefore underinclusive because it fails to prevent subsequent
children from resorting to welfare.
Second, ignoring subsequent children as a means of correcting defi-
ciencies in the cost of raising children is similarly underinclusive. By
giving a larger share of the support-paying parent's income to the first
family, the income available to the support-paying parent's subsequent
children is compromised. Because it fails to provide sufficient support
for subsequent children, the statute is again underinclusive.
Third, the popular argument advanced for ignoring subsequent chil-
dren is that "the problems of inadequate support for children of multiple
relationships would be alleviated if parents were discouraged from hav-
ing more children unless they were capable of contributing adequately to
174. Krause, supra note 34, at 357 (footnote omitted).
175. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
176. Daniel v. Family See. Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220 (1949). "This court in passing upon
the validity of a state statute ... must indulge in every presumption of constitutionality and
construe the statute in any way which its language permits in order to sustain its validity....
All doubt should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the statute." Id. at 220.
177. See Lindsley, 220 U.S. at 61.
178. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text (relief of dependence on welfare
funds); notes 118-21 and accompanying text (correct child support award to reflect real cost of
raising children); notes 106-10 and accompanying text (restraint on family size); notes 124-25
and accompanying text (administrative convenience); note 149 and accompanying text (public
morality); notes 29-31 and accompanying text (provide support for first family); note 173 and
accompanying text (equal protection does not demand absolute equality).
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the needs of all their offspring."' 179 But the state's desire to discourage
the support-paying parent from having more children is not a legitimate
government interest. Even if one were to point out that overpopulation
and welfare dependency substantiates this government interest, ignoring
the subsequent children of support-paying parents is grossly underinclu-
sive. This approach discourages neither the support-paying parent nor
the population at large from having additional children.
Fourth, ignoring subsequent children is not rationally related to ad-
ministrative convenience because the very same administrative conven-
ience is served when child support guidelines clearly provide for
subsequent children. The classification between first and second families
could not be anything but arbitrary when the result is to take support
from one group of children to give it to another for the sake of adminis-
trative convenience.
Fifth, ignoring subsequent children as a means of protecting public
morality by discouraging divorce is underinclusive. While the thought of
less support for contemplated future children may inhibit the potential
support-paying parent from divorce, it would not so inhibit the potential
custodial parent, or, for that matter, those couples who do not have
children.
Lastly, ignoring subsequent children under state child support
guidelines intentionally produces the incongruous result of inequity
among children so similarly situated that they have the very same sup-
port-paying parent.
Conclusion: The Constitutional Model
All children are entitled to adequate support from their parents.
This Note does not support reducing the overall obligation of the sup-
port-paying parent to his or her children. Rather, it advocates a redistri-
bution of the support-paying parent's income between first and
subsequent children so that all children receive an equal proportion of
parental income.
In order to avoid violating the Equal Protection Clause of the fed-
eral constitution, state child support guidelines must take into considera-
tion the support-paying parent's responsibility for subsequently born or
adopted children. The prior support order must be modifiable so that all
the children of the support-paying parent may be treated equally.
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